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A New Economic Model for Iraq: Future Vision and Market-Oriented State
Corporations Foster Liberalization of Oil-Rentier Economies
Sabri Zire Al-Saadi, 6/1/2012 
Introduction
Iraq’s loaded experience is a thought-provoking case for better understanding of the potentialities of the
oil-rentier developing countries. Over the last six decades, Iraq underwent radical economic and violent
political changes. Since 1952, oil revenues play an important role in the country's economic, social, and
political development. During the 1950's, 1960's & 1970's, the governments’ utilization of oil revenues,
though not always efficient, was promising for building the country’s infrastructure, increasing economic
growth, as well as improving the living standards. Significantly, the economic model of the 1970's was
characterized by the dominance of the state where the share of public sector in GDP has substantially
increased, especially in crude oil and mining extraction industry, petrochemical industry, banking, trade,
manufacturing industries, and agriculture. However, since 1980, Iraq has suffered from major
devastating three wars and economic decline and costly political events that resulted in the fall of
Saddam’s dictatorial regime which followed by more deterioration of the prevailing conditions. In addition
to the political and security problems, Iraq at present is facing many difficult socio-economic challenges:
the poverty; sluggish real growth; high unemployment; low productivity; low standards of living; and
widespread corruption.
In a wider geopolitical context and given the lessons learned from recent global financial crises and
world economic slowdown, Iraq’s awaited economic model that should benefit from the actual
experience of globalization positives and negatives, could also generate far-reaching political and
economic impact on the security and prosperity of the unstable strategic Middle East region that is rich
in oil and gas.
Oil-rentier countries have many differences in their political, social, demographical characteristics, the
level of industrial production capacities, the diversity of their natural resources, and their GDP per head.
However, they have an important similarity in the dominant role of oil wealth on the political economy
and social development' process. All these countries are dependant heavily on crude oil exports for
financing the aggregate demand, and the economic dynamics is manipulated by public enterprises and
the macro fiscal and monetary policies.[1] Significantly, in addition to using the accumulated oil
revenues; i.e. "sovereign funds", the oil-rentier states owned and control the crude oil and gas
industries, as well as have the major shares of the basic industries; namely, the petrochemicals, steel,
electricity, and banks. Evidently, oil  revenues have been stimulus to economic growth, but not enough
for the expansion of domestic capacities to produce goods and services and trading. Also, irrational use
of oil-revenues restricts the drive for economic and political liberalization because of the negative
dynamics of the "excessive" oil revenues that finance the "exorbitant" government expenditures. An
outcome of this dynamics has been the increase of financial burden of the public enterprises though
most of them were based on technically and economically feasible studies. In addition, domestic energy
subsidies and increasing energy consumption add more constraints to its economic reforms.
Also significant, oil  exports have been subject to the risk of external unfavorable conditions; namely, the
interruption of unpredicted political and economic events in the short-run, and the upwards trend of
using renewable and nuclear energy resources by the industrialized countries in the long-run. Therefore,
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emphasis on lessening the economy's dependence on oil should be considered by those countries as a
prime objective of their economic strategy and reform.
This paper analyses Iraq’s experience and prospect as a case that highlights the most likely process of
economic growth in the oil-rentier countries under the conditions of economic diversification strategy.[2]
The review of oil fortune’s influence on the political economy, especially during the painful and very
costly nine years experience of post-Saddam period, suggest that alternative of economic strategy and
policies including public investment priorities should replace the current fragmented and irrelevant
liberalization measures which have been imposed by the US occupation authority and applied in a
disarray practices by the governments. Different from the widely practiced market reforms in developing
economies, Iraq needs a profound change for restructuring the economy to be less dependent on oil
sector and be more competitive and stable. In view of the causes and actual remedies of the recent
global and Eurozone financial crises, the question is; what kind of new economic model Iraq must
adopt? Is State Corporations Model (SCM) or in aggregate–term, the State Capitalism Model, where the
independent management of big industrial public corporations that are powered with freedom of
initiative, innovation capacity, and entrepreneurial skill which fit market competitiveness’ conditions, does
the trick of accelerating economic growth and help the efforts for structural changes and liberalizing
Iraq's oil-hostage economy? If so, what are the necessary conditions of this new model?
It should be noted that for identifying the required policies, neither the basic assumptions of neo-
classical economics where the macroeconomic policies justify the role of the state for increasing growth,
nor the classic economics of capitalism where the “invisible hand” of the free market and profit
maximization of corporations that stimulate growth, are relevant to tackle the structural economic
problems and social development of Iraq as a developing oil-rentier economy.
The Complex Challenge
Although the basic remedies for dealing with the main problem of oil-rentier economies have been
widely debated for a long time,[3] elaboration and modification to the earlier proposals are required to
match the prevailing new conditions and avoid the crises’ consequences of the economic globalization
era including the increasing measures of protectionism. For Iraq’s prospect, new economic planning
effort, policies and measures are also essential; namely, formulation of the goals of the “ignored”
“national future vision”, refining the priorities of the long-term economic strategy, programming the
structural economic reforms, identifying the relevant macroeconomic policies, and developing the
incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for indigenizing high-technology industries. Also essential,
clarifying the conditions and pace for economic integration into the world economy in view of the policy
implications of recent global and Eurozone financial crises and the slowdown of the world's economic
growth.[4] At the heart of Iraq’s required economic strategy lies a well-defined economic diversification
plan that has to be implemented by the government in the medium and long-term.
For the developing and emerging economies, expanding production capacities have been given priority
not only for increasing the production of goods and services and trading, but also for improving
productivity. In this process, both growth and competitiveness are enhanced by economic diversification
that has several benefits for the developing as well as developed countries. Diversification ensures
stability against the risk of market uncertainty, promotes diffusion of technologies, and provides flexibility
to inter-industry linkages, trade, labor market, and other factors of production. However, unlike the
experience of most developing countries, efforts for economic diversification in the oil-rentier countries
must not be directed mainly at increasing the role of the private sector that has small capacity and little
innovative and entrepreneurial skill. Instead, the state should seize the opportunity of having substantial
amount of "sovereign oil fund" for increasing investment in the leading industries. Indeed, oil revenues
provide enough financial and foreign currency resources for investment in new industrial enterprises in
addition to building the physical, social, and environmental infrastructure projects. The state intervention
and facilities coupled with the application of different approach to the management operation and
objectives of the public enterprises should be applied in order to lead the nation's effort for fostering
economic diversification, increasing production and productivity, and sustaining competitiveness. Such
new approach implies that the benefit from globalization and the integration into the world economy
should be conditioned by the state long-term economic strategic objectives. Also, it implies that the
public enterprises management should learn from the failure of past experience and instead apply the
private corporations' management skill, creativity, business initiatives, and entrepreneurial of the market
economy. These steps that develop the objectives and operation criteria of the old fashion management
of public sector enterprises into big market-oriented state corporations that constitute the base of
"SCM,"[5] which is, at this stage of development, essential for the success of economic diversification
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that paves the way for the liberalization of the oil-hostage economies.
In a wider context, since it is necessary to ensuring the flow of crude oil, minimizing the cost of energy
resources, and protecting global environment; liberalization of these economies also serves the interest
of maintaining sustainable growth of the world economy. Even the application of partial measures of
economic reforms such as the reduction of energy subsidies and rationalizing the consumption of
energy must be considered within the overall economic diversification strategy.
In reality, the application of the suggested remedy is not an easy task. It is difficult, but it is also a
promising medication. Similar to the cautious use of pharmaceutical drugs in medical treatment that
avoids the risk of letting the patient fall in the self-destructive illegal drugs addiction, Iraq’s oil-rent
should be carefully utilized in dealing with the existing chronic structural economic problem, the
amounting social problems, the political instability, and the stalled democracy. This is in contrast to the
adventure of exercising loose liberalizing practices and falling deeper in the harmful spiral trap of
continuous increase of government spending that hangs on "excessive" increase of oil revenues and
successive finance, which resulting in the expansion of public and individuals consumption beyond the
country's non-oil production capacities. At present, the misuse of “exorbitant” spending of the public oil
revenues through the inconsistent and inefficient macroeconomic fiscal, monetary, investment, and trade
policies and measures have crippled more the Iraqi economy. The effects of misuse of oil power on
domestic politics have also been harmful. Equally serious, the continuous dependence on oil revenues
affects negatively the good social values of work and nurtures the seeds for over-relaxation in a rentier
culture.
While the world’s experience has ascertained the benefits of the globalization thrust; i.e. stimulate the
improvement of productivity, business entrepreneurial, and competitiveness, Iraq’s experience provide
evidence that no concrete justification allows the dominance of the global financial and trade regulations
and priorities over the need for indigenous structural economic reforms and the required macroeconomic
policies that fit the domestic market conditions.
Politically, freedom is the most precious right of the human beings that cannot be sustained without
ensuring the basic living needs for the people. Fortunately, the Iraqis have regained their basic liberties
after painful suffering and huge sacrifices for a long time, with the historically significant help from the
US, Britain, and their Allies in toppling the former dictatorial regime on 9th April 2003. This
accomplishment has been a necessary condition for preserving the citizen's integrity and paves the road
to economic prosperity, social progress, flourish democracy, and culture welfare. Although these
objectives have not yet realized, Iraq will ultimately rise again as an independent, stable, prosperous,
and democratic country since it is endowed with rich resources, and most likely this free and
multicultural nation shall be inspired by the vision of "what Iraq's future ought to be," rather than "what
Iraq's future could be."
However, at present, it is even more demanding for Iraq to consider that the growing worrying of certain
domestic negative factors: the continuous political instability; ineffective governments; and the paucity of
the liberal and democratic parties. These factors that are enforced by the wide anticipation of holding
excessive oil revenues in the near future, could quickly drive the ruling authority with the influence of US
and IMF - consciously or unconsciously – to follow the prevailing political economy' model practiced by
the oil-rentier states in the Gulf region.[6] In fact, such trend has been partially experienced in Iraq by
Kurdistan Federal Government (KFG). Unfortunately, this model is neither suitable for Iraq’s economic
development as envisaged by the citizens before and after the fall of the former regime, nor would
contribute to the political stability of the ME region. Alternatively, based on the predictive dynamics of the
Iraqi economy,[7] and reassured by certain successful foreign experiences of state capitalism model,[8]
the priorities and criteria for utilizing oil fortune in tackling challenges facing the country should be
radically changed.
Oil Governs the Future
The strategic importance of crude oil as a main source of global energy, as well as a major source of
income and foreign currency for the developing oil-rentier countries are indisputable facts that need not
to be emphasized. For other concerned parties: the oil consumer countries are trying to maintain the
supply flow of oil at lowest prices; the major international oil companies are interested in maximizing the
profit for their shareholders; and the oil traders and financial speculators are cleverly exploiting the
financial benefits of the oil price fluctuations in the world market. However, unlike the interests of the
consumer countries, the oil companies, the oil traders, and the speculative investors in oil prices, Iraq
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has different priorities. It is not only increasing the value added of oil, but it is also essential for Iraq,
expanding the non-oil industrial production capacity, improving the living standards, promoting social
progress, maintaining "just" distribution of public wealth, sustaining political stability, and encouraging
democracy practices. In addition, by appreciating the need for environmental and natural resources
development and considering the interests of next generations, especially in regard to the depletion of
crude oil and natural gas resources, the call for "sustainable development" is therefore more appropriate
than to focus the efforts on only economic growth and stability similar to the practices of the developed
countries. A significant difference is that, unlike the guidance of economic efficiency criteria for the
allocation of the tax payers' money through the government fiscal policy, oil revenues that finance the
government expenditures which dominate the aggregate demand are owned by all "Iraqis" regardless of
their individual income and wealth. The implication is that the priorities for the allocation of oil revenues
are bound to be different from the macroeconomic policies that are generally suggested for the
developing countries.
In a modern state, respect of basic human rights: the liberties; security; rule of law and public order; and
the provision of basic education and health services, clean water, housing, and electricity, are all
fundamental conditions for economic progress and social welfare. Application of these norms requires
good government’s management for the utilization of oil wealth.
The country’s experience showed that neither the mummified policies of the highly centralized and
comprehensive socio-economic development planning and the dominance of role of the rigid public
sector enterprises of the totalitarian former regime, nor the current loose application of the panacea
economic reforms and policies of the IMF and the World Bank that are strongly backed by the US
political influence, are relevant to deal with the existing acute economic and social problems.
Specifically, the post-war inhomogeneous governments that are flying blind with the application of non-
conditional liberalization policies have miserably failed to ensure the minimum conditions for economic
and social development despite of the availability of financial and foreign currency resources.
Since the fall of the former regime, Iraq’s problems have not eased and the country is still facing not
only the political instability and insecurity miseries, but also the challenges of the faulty structural
economy, high unemployment, widespread poverty, lack of basic needs and public services, low private
savings, insufficient physical infrastructure, and increasing corruption that put the authority of the
government and public institutions at high risk of losing the control completely. Nevertheless, if oil  wealth
used efficiently, not only the economic objectives could be achieved, but it would also release the social
tension arising from the sectarian conflict, combating the religious extremism, and depriving the
advantages of the terrorist and the anti-liberal groups from the existing social discontent environment.
Under the present circumstances, the government holds the oil power that could positively influence the
country’s future development. Hence, a democratically elected and politically committed government can
use rationally this massive power of oil-rent for the benefit of Iraq.
Iraq’s Political Economy
With the great power of oil wealth,[9] the Iraqi central government makes the choice between the crucial
economic alternatives,[10] rather than the citizens or the labor unions or the public enterprises or the
private companies or the business entrepreneurs or the local authorities. Hence, for assessing Iraq’s
economic prospect, what matters is the awareness of the behavior and dynamics of the government
conduct the allocation of oil revenues.[11] The government’s policies have been influencing the
macroeconomic events; i.e. they are making the choice between main alternatives in production,
distribution, consumption, and investment, especially for the reconstruction of public infrastructure, but
they were deplorably inefficient and insufficient.
Unfortunately, for a long time, the nation could not establish a democratic regime capable of ensuring
efficient utilization of the country’s natural and human resources. In post-Saddam period, it was not good
enough to change the policy-making players and personalities. What is more important is the right
change of the country’s objectives and policies as part of overhaul change in the political culture and
economic thinking. The governments have missed the relevant macroeconomic and social priorities and
intended to play populist politics that in turn caused more waste of public resources and loss of
development opportunities. Indeed, the task of designing and implementing the required economic
strategy and policies, as well as identifying the investment priorities cannot be performed by the weak or
ideologically rigid government who relied heavily on oil revenues.[12] Instead, Iraq needs a forceful and
inspiring political leadership that has a clear progressive future vision and is capable to lead the people,
the entrepreneurs, the business community, and the private companies to establish a rigorous economic
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system with the help of oil wealth. Regrettably, the existing political structure and process is unqualified
to allow the emergence of such leadership that could make the right political and major economic
choices. So far, the political arrangements – developed under the circumstances of fear and mistrust
among social and political groups and lack of confidence in politicians – have produced ineffective
dominance of religious; Shiite and Sunni, and the Kurdish nationalist parties, both have strong but
vague ideological commitments, though in different degrees, as well as produced very weak and
fragmented liberal and democratic parties who should play at least a positive role in opposition.[13]
Also, the experience have missed the importance of effective non-governmental organizations and the
participation of the civil society groups in monitoring the government’s decisions and enhancing the
democratic practices although many of them have been officially licensed.[14]
The weary and farcical experience of the government-forming process and the current inhomogeneous
coalition government that followed the successful general election of 7th March 2010 and ended in
nominating the Prime Minister on 11th Nov. 2010 and the government finally formed in 21st Dec. 2010,
revealed how unstable the political power-struggle and indecisive compromise among the dominant
parties is.[15] It perpetuates the ineffectiveness of the political leadership and adds to evidence that the
demand for political reform is urgent. The constitutional law, the election rules, the legal and executive
rights of the state and the government hierarchy, and the political institutions and facilities for smooth
transfer of the authority’s power, must be all reformed. In addition, the stagnation of the non-oil
economic activities, especially the public sector enterprises, needs policy and institutional reforms. Also
essential, by gradual increase of the contribution of taxes on income and profit,[16] and other sources of
public finance, it would generate an impetus that improving economic efficiency and enhancing the
democratic practices, as well as restoring the government integrity.
In politics, pragmatism is normally practiced for regulating and manipulating the political processes,
whereas in development economics it is essential to strictly observe policy objectives based on pre-
determined priority criteria. Also, it is a common knowledge that freedom and political stability constitute
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for economic and social development. In democratic practices,
when the country is facing unexpected problematic events, the government usually invites the opinions
and remedy proposals from different concerned parties: the political opposition; the independent and
non-partisan groups; and the professional experts. Ironically, in Iraq, where there are amounting socio-
economic and political problems, the government and the dominant political parties were not open to
indigenous opinion and had no appetite to consult independent and qualified native advisors though
they had no clear and consistent economic strategy and policies.[17] Indeed, the ruling authority
incompetence is beyond imagination as can be shown by the following striking example. The members
of the "working group responsible for identifying the economic policy for Iraq": the Vice PM and Head of
Economic Committee of the Parliament; Minister of Finance; Minister of Oil; and the Head of Public
Finance Editing Diwan (office), have had their first meeting on early February 2012; that is to say nine
years after the fall of the former regime, in order to identify the main economic challenges facing the
country. The meeting's outcome is astonishingly brilliant! The members of the committee have just
discovered that there are seven economic challenges facing Iraq. These are: transformation to market
economy; unemployment; chronic inflation; structural imbalances of the economy; foreign debt;
rebuilding the infrastructure; and the legacy of the laws and regulations of the former regime.[18] What
an outstanding visionary performance!
It is unfortunate that the authorities who are “isolated in their offices”, not only ignore non-governmental
views and proposals, but also they shrink from engaging themselves in public debate or giving formal
economic policy explanation. Such negative attitude was not only a result of poor economic knowledge
and audacity, but most important, it was the temptation of using the abundant oil revenues easily in
defusing temporarily the daily demands of the people.[19] The renewable proposal for distributing some
of oil revenues among the citizens is an example.[20] Significantly, by relying on foreign consultancies
and experts especially of the IMF, WB, USAID, and other institutions for economic advice, the
governments surpass the role of indigenous expertise and advisers who are, the least to say, more
familiar with the country’s reality.[21] Actually, the non-restricted and non-productive spending of the
excessive oil revenues by the government and, indirectly, by the political parties has saved their
existence by releasing the pressure of public discontent and demand though temporarily. In general, it is
very hard to imagine how these incapable governments and parties could have survived without the use
of the public oil revenues. They were very lucky indeed. Oil revenues have been extensively used to
carry on the state's functions and activities, especially in maintaining security and rebuilding the army, as
well as in influencing the domestic politics in pragmatic ways. In 2010, the total salaries and wages of
the civil servants constituted 47% of the annual budget's operational expenditures, in addition to the
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expenditures of the parliament activities and the presidency office that totaled 8% of the budget. In
reality, oil  revenues have been used as an extinguisher instrument for fighting brushfires, but not as
strategic development factor which needs strict application of efficient allocation criteria under public
approval and observation.
In Iraq's extraordinary difficult circumstances, pragmatic measures are not entirely unacceptable. In fact,
even in a normal and politically stable situation, pragmatism is followed for dealing with the sudden
major political, social, and economic change of events.[22] But the problem with the Iraqi ad-hoc
measures and inconsistent policies lies in the fact that both the government and the political parties
neither have viable national future's vision and clear economic and social strategic goals, nor committed,
individually or collectively, to a specific number of objective' priorities. Such a vague situation confirms
that there is no factor more important than the use of oil wealth in influencing Iraq’s reality and shaping
its future beyond the interest in increasing non-oil financial contribution to the annual budget.
In addition to the extremely difficult security circumstances, the governments’ incompetence that
sustained by the application of the flaw economic policies and self-interest measures, have led not only
to the apparent economic failure, but also encouraged the corruption that reached extremely serious
edge threatening the effectiveness of the government and public institutions, as well as affected the
social morality values. Corruption, as it is known, means the use of public resources and the state power
for serving self-interest. This is exactly what is happening in misusing oil power on a large scale.
The citizens’ high expectations vis-à-vis the government’s fading promises have resulted in credibility
loss of the government and the dominant political parties as reflected by the widespread skepticism and
passive attitude among the citizens. In turn, the credibility wane adds more pressure on the ruling
authority to increase public spending and finally increase the economy reliance on oil revenues.
Due to its strategic geopolitical position in the unstable ME region,[23] it is most likely that the following
external factors could also affect Iraq’s political economy:
1. The US has strategic interests in the ME region and its military presence and political
influence will most likely remain in Iraq for a long- time. However, the fast failure of the
US economic strategy has either confirmed the complete inexperience of the country’s
economic problems and remedies by the occupation authority, or indirectly supported the
implicit suggestion that Iraq's economic policies should remain the same as those
practiced by other oil-rentier countries in the region. Or a defect of both suggestions. This
is in contrast to the promising future of a stable, democratic, and prosperous for Iraq that
has potentialities in terms of human and natural resources, social components and
values, and historical roots of mixed and creative culture. Thus, it is neither in the
interests of Iraq nor to the US to keep the economy dependant on oil exports since the
outcome of this dependence could perpetuate the disappointing conditions and policies. 
2. The efficient use of the oil fortune will help the economy grow at higher rates and cope
with the globalization competitiveness conditions. Parallel to this target, the likely growing
economic and oil power of Iraq could also change the aggressive and/or the passive
political attitude of the neighboring states towards its internal affairs.[24] The experience
of pre- and post-election of 2010 showed how serious is to minimize foreign intervention
and influence in domestic politics. Iraq needs to regain its economic strength that will be
transferred to a strong political protective presence in the ME region.
Given the political and security requirements, the institutional fundamentals of the targeted reforms that
would ensure the rational choice of macroeconomic policy alternatives should maintain the central
government control of the following:
1. The oil revenues purse and allocations. 
2. The macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies. 
3. Financing the public infrastructure and utilities projects. 
4. Investment in high-technology industrial corporations to be owned fully or partially by
the state.  
5. The design and implementation of the privatization program. 
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6. The regulations and provision of incentives for promoting investment by the indigenous
private sector and the FDI.
At the same time, it is important to develop the institutional mechanism and financial capacity of the
local authorities of the governorates to be able of designing, partially financing, and managing the
implementation of the public utilities and small works projects. In addition, the establishment of local
councils within the big cities; i.e. Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Erbil are also required to expand and
improve the public services and utilities, as well as the follow-up the implementation of public works
programs.
Crucial Economic and Social Issues
It was optimistically presumed that the post-Saddam government and the emerging opposition parties
would be able to lead the country towards achieving its social, economic, and political objectives.
Unfortunately, many causes have jeopardized the people's optimism. In particular, the poor economic
performance form a strong ring in the problematic chain of vicious circles; namely, the security problem,
social discontent and hardship living, the political instability, the corruption, the crime, and the sectarian
conflict. The social problems, especially the religious and ethnic sectarian conflicts, have a strong
regressive dynamics.
However, Iraq is endowed with abundant natural and human resources as well financial and foreign
currency resources that are necessary for investment for rebuilding the infrastructure and improving the
living standards.[25] The huge amount of increasing government expenditures and its non-productive
allocation is a clear evidence for potential increase in economic growth.[26] The evidence also show
that the misuse of these resources created fiscal problems.[27]
Specifically, Iraq at present is facing many crucial economic and social problems[28] which can be
ranked in accordance with their priorities that are relevant to the suggested economic strategy as
follows:
1. Sluggish Real Economic Growth and Structural Imbalance: the use of GDP and GDP
per capita statistics in assessing the economic performance and the living standards in
Iraq, as usually practiced world wide, needs analytical qualifications and explanation due
to the high fluctuated contribution of oil value added to GDP. Available GDP official
estimates (at current prices) show that it increased from about ID107,828.5m ($84,531m)
in 2007, ID155982.3m ($132,770m) in 2008, ID139330.2m ($120,869m) in 2009 and
ID171957.0m ($147,826) in 2010.[29] Accordingly, GDP per head increased from about
$2,848 in 2007, $4163 in 2008, $3765 in 2009, and $4,466 in 2010;[30] i.e., GDP
(current prices) grew at annual average of 44.7%, -10.7%, and 13.3% in 2008, 2009,
and 2010, while GDP per capita grew at annual average of 46.2% in 2008, -9.6% in
2009 and 18.6% in 2010. Such astonishing uneven trend is obviously a result of oil price
fluctuations during the four years period. Even if we consider the GDP indicators at
constant prices, they do not adequately reflect the real macroeconomic performance and
the progress made in the living standards in Iraq as usually used for country’s
comparison purposes.[31] The reason is not only related to the distortion caused by the
change of prices of the consumer and capital goods and raw materials, during the year,
but most importantly it is related to the fact that the value added of oil sector contributes
about 53.7%, 56.0%, 40.1% and 43.0% of total GDP in the years 2007-2010. Moreover,
the contribution of the non-oil sector to GDP shows either deterioration or stagnation of
the commodity sectors compared to the services sector. E.g. the value added of
agriculture sector contributed 5.0%, 3.5%, 4.4%, and 5.0% to GDP of 2007-2010, while
the services sectors, mainly of government services, increased from 12.2%, 12.4%,
17.9%, and 15.9% in 2007-2010, and manufacturing industries contributed 1.7%, 1.5%,
2.4%, and 2.3% in the same years. Demand composition of GDP shows that in 2008, for
example, the government consumption shared 46% of the national consumption and the
actual public investment (fixed capital formation) contributed 94.1% to total national
investment and imports, which were mainly financed by oil exports earnings of foreign
currency. It is the oil revenues, not the non-oil economic activities that are behind the
GDP growth. In this respect, it is interesting that the IMF estimates of Iraq's GDP for the
years 2007-2014 neither adequately reflects reality nor they help in describing the
economy dynamics.[32] Therefore, at this stage, the use of GDP estimates has little
analytical value for assessing the real performance of the economy. It is a tricky indicator
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that does not reflect the real factor behind the expansion of the non-oil production
capacities and the improvement of the living standards.[33] 
2. High Unemployment and Underemployment: published official statistics on
employment have estimated the unemployment average rate at about 8% in 2010.[34]
The ratio of unemployed male was 7% and 13% for women. However, the
underemployed; i.e. those who have temporary and limited work' hours, estimated at
15%. As generally observed in reality, most of the active labor force is either idle or semi-
idle except the people working in the government. Therefore, one might assume that the
unemployment rate is much higher than 8% and nearly 20%. Significantly, the
government institutions employed 40% of the total number of working people, while the
private sector employed the rest 59%. Also, unemployment and underemployment was
uneven among the Governorates; the highest rate was (16%, 19%) in ThiQar, the lowest
(2%, 4%) in Kirkuk, (7%, 12%) in Baghdad, and (4%, 12%) in Erbil. Significantly, the civil
servants and the police and the army employees are estimated at about 2,468,422
employees in 2010[35] and most of them are idle.[36] Also important, only less than 1%
of the working manpower was employed by the oil sector.[37] 
3. Widespread Poverty: poverty in Iraq has been spreading fast since the UN economic
and trade sanctions imposed on the country in August 1990, but it increased after 2003
to reach the ratio of 22.9% in 2008; i.e. the number of poor people was 8 millions.[38]
Luckily, the “poverty gap” estimated at 4.5% which means that the roots of poverty are
not very deep and can be dealt with by investing extra resources. Poverty distribution
pattern showed that there exist wide disparities among the Governorates; e.g. the poverty
ration in Muthana estimated at 49%, 41% in Babel, 40% in Selah el-din, whereas
estimated at only 3% in Erbil & Suleymanya, 9% in Dahouk, and 13% in Baghdad.[39]
However, the governments have failed to deal with this serious socio-economic problem,
and surprisingly the program of the present government even avoids recognizing the
existence of severe poverty in the country[40] since the current staple food ration system
show that the problem is much more acute than the official estimates suggest.
Regardless of their claims and ideals, the governments have had enough money to
make the fight against poverty its central mission by implementing public work programs
and promoting small businesses that provide job opportunities and generate income for
the poor people. The allocation of oil revenues must address the roots of poverty
problem. Private or public charities are not the solution, but creating productive jobs and
generating income from economic activities is the remedy. It is the sluggish economic
growth, high unemployment, poor public education and health services and utilities, lack
of basic needs for infrastructure; e.g. electricity and clean water that have been the
pathway to the existing poverty and social breakdown. While it is necessary that the
government should put emphasis on improving the primary and secondary education of
the poor people; the root of the poverty problem, it should not ignores the economic
factors behind the existing poverty. More disappointing, with the availability of abundant
oil revenues, the government suggest to rely on the donors and regional and international
organization to finance poverty alleviation projects.[41] 
4. Wide Disparity in Income and Wealth: low pay to the workers against the runaway
salaries at the top of government officials kept poverty and inequality stubbornly high and
politically dangerous. Available rough estimates indicate the gravity of the situation where
the annual salary and allowances of the parliament member amounted to about
$300,000 whereas the senior civil servants and the university academic staff receive
more than $12,000 on the average, and the majority of government employee receives
about $4,000. However, the average wages in the private sector was about $10 daily.[42]
The disparity may also be assessed by referring to the fact that while 21% of the labor
force work in the agriculture sector, the value added generated by the sector was
estimated at only 3.45% of GDP in 2008.[43] As referred earlier, unemployment and
poverty distribution among Governorates have wide disparity patterns. 
5. Corruption: the exorbitant government spending, the collapses of the public
institutions, the security problems, and the economic failure have all led to the collapse of
law and order. While the international comparisons of corruption; i.e. the corruption index
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
http://nps.edu/programs/ccs/webjournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=116[6/12/2012 3:12:51 PM]
2011, placed Iraq at the bottom rank of 175 among the 182 countries,[44] recent survey
showed that most Iraqis agreed that there is widespread corruption practices in the civil
servant institutions, the government, the political parties, the parliament, the judiciary
institutions, the private sector, as well as in international organization, and in international
non-governmental organization.[45] It is essential to emphasize that spread pace of
corruption is strongly related to the degree of failure in maintain economic growth and
stability, increasing employment and alleviating poverty, controlling inflation, and
improving the living standards.[46]
6. The Food Ration System: although the subsidy cost of the food ration system financed
by the annual budget estimated at about $2,998m in 2010,[47] the perpetuation of the
system and the indirect income support given to the less productive civil servants boost
the “little wealth of the poor”. However, the poor are still have no economic means and
activities for generating enough income. Thus, instead of the food ration system, a
radical comprehensive and well integrated program to eliminate poverty should be
initiated by a government entity alongside with other economic growth policies. This is
essential especially when the government intend to conclude the food ration system as
quickly as possible.[48] 
7. Low Non-Oil Exports: at present, non-oil exports contribute very little to the trade
balance which has always been a surplus. Crude oil exports contributed 99% and 97% to
the value of total exports in 2009 and 2010. It is self-evident that these facts implies very
risky structural gap that urgently necessitates the increase of non-oil export- oriented
activities.[49]
Future Vision, Economic Priorities, and State Capitalism
"In 2030, an independent, prosperous, and democratic Iraq will hold a prestigious place in the world. In
2030, all three dimensions of "sustainable development"; i.e. economic growth, social progress, and
environmental protection and natural resources development, will be maintained. Iraq's competitive and
diversified economy that has industrial knowledge-base corporations, innovative technology,
entrepreneurial, and science capacities, will occupies an important position in the world economy as a
major energy source of crude oil, industrial hub, and a center of financial services in the ME region. Its
trade and investment in the region and the world will be significant. The conditions for free market; i.e.
freedom of work, property ownership, investment, and trade, will be prevailed, and the state's economic
and financial regulations will be minimized. The economy will no longer depend mainly on oil exports. In
addition to the leading vigorous public-private sharing of industrial corporations, the private sector; the
big companies, medium and small industries, and business firms, will play an important role in
production, investment, and exports activities.
Socially; all  citizens are equal and will enjoy full range of political and social liberties in an open
multicultural and tolerant society guided by ethical and human values. The society will benefit from an
integrated social securities and welfare system that ensure basic education and health services, as well
as helping the unemployed, retired, elderly, and needy people. The middle class will play a pioneer and
dominant role in the economic, social, technological, and culture development. Iraqi labor force will be
characterized by high productivity and skill and the ability for initiative and innovation. All citizens will
participate actively in the management of the state activities.”[50]
Prior to identifying the economic strategy objectives and policy priorities, it is essential to outline in a
wide futuristic framework that is based on past experience the notion that the nation must be incited by
"what Iraq's future ought to be”, but not, "what Iraq's future would be". This is neither a perfect
imaginative political proposition, nor a definite description or prediction of the country's future reality that
is compatible with the possible advance of technology; nevertheless, it is definitely an inspiring
vision:[51]
Iraq, at present, is a developing country which has a small economy in terms of GDP, low GDP per
head, and very low value added of non-oil sectors, shortage of skilled labor, lack of infrastructure,
decline in entrepreneurship, weak private sector, and widespread informal sector activities. However,
Iraq, as it is well-known, is endowed with human and abundant natural resources; crude oil and natural
gas, water for irrigation, cultivatable land, and promising productive manpower. Also, the nation has rich
and creative culture heritage deep in history.[52] Iraq, therefore, is qualified and deserve better than the
modest future vision recently suggested by the "national development plan 2010-2015" adopted by the
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government to lead the country for achieving sustainable economic growth and strategic development
objectives.[53] An attempt to assess the government's proposed economic strategy and policies during
the period (2003-date) in retrospective with the past experiences of using oil revenues by the
governments during an "assumed" five periods (1921-1951, 1952-1958, 1959-1968, 1969-2003, and
2003-date), is neither logical nor realistic or even fair to historical judgment. However, it is very important
to highlight the ways the decision-makers use oil revenues in order to reveal the extent of the present
state of inefficient utilization of public resources. In contrast, even when oil revenues were insignificant
in the period (1921-1951), the then governments tried to allocate them to finance some of the most
needed public infrastructure projects though they failed to keep their promises under the pressure of
improving the public services especially during the difficult period of Second World War. At that time,
they used oil revenues for financing the current expenditures of the annual budgets because they were
obliged to scrap the implementation of most planned projects of the “development programs.”[54] In the
second period, the governments were more cautious in utilizing the oil revenues for financing a number
of required physical and social infrastructure projects, as well as for improving public basic services. In
(1959-1968) period, although the governments recognized the need for reducing the economy’s
dependence on oil sector and put more emphasis on industrial development, they actually reallocated
more oil revenues to finance the government current expenditures; i.e. public consumption. During the
period (1968-2003), oil revenues were utilized mainly to serve the vague “Arab Socialism” ideology and
imposing the political objectives of the former regime disregarding the individual liberties and democracy
and the required promotion of the private sector. Though the former regime was well aware, especially
prior to the full nationalization of oil foreign companies in 1974, of the risk of dependent heavily on oil
revenues for financing the government expenditures, its policies and allocation priorities failed to
develop enough non-oil industrial capacities and non-oil exports, as well as failed in generating non-oil
financial sources for the state’s annual budget.
As the Iraqis regained their basic liberties, they were inspired by the cause of building a liberal,
democratic, and economically prosperous regime. However, the post- 2003 economic reforms were ill
advised by implementing the hasty and non-conditional liberalization policy and advocating the pre-
mature privatization of the oil industry and the public enterprises prior to their rehabilitation
requirements.[55] Also, the recently proposed easy move, though not yet legalized, to consider
unconditional accession to the WTO, would be more harmful to the infant industries and agriculture
production than would enhance the intended economic reforms.[56] And the promises of improving the
investment environment by the introduction of “investment law of 2007” that suppose to promote
investment, especially FDI, have quickly evaporated.[57] The unsuccessful IMF, WB, and US policy
reforms was a result of misidentifying the economic priorities and the absence of oil utilization criteria
that match with the dynamics of the real driving economic, social, and political forces.
On the other side, the lack of the political system in providing wide choices adds to the economic failure,
it is extremely difficult to assume that the dominant religious political parties are capable of undertaking
the required radical economic reforms and cope with the existing problems, as well as facing the
unexpected global economic, technological, and political fast moving events.
Good macroeconomic management needs careful assessment of the public finance, the availability of
financial resources for investment, the public debt, and the country’s reserve of foreign currency.[58]
Therefore, the following policy areas should have priority importance:
1. Increasing public investment for the erection of the economic infrastructure projects;
i.e. dams for water resources, salty land reclamation, roads, railways, ports, modern
telecommunications network etc. In addition to developing the existing basic industries;
the petrochemicals, oil refining, electricity, sulfur and phosphate mining, aluminum,
fertilizer, and finance new high-technology industries; e.g. steel and car industries, in the
form of vigorous public and public- private owned corporations that can fit the current
conditions of free market; namely, applying independent managerial operations that allow
initiatives, innovation, entrepreneurial, and marketing skills. The proposed investment
programme in non-oil industries constitutes the base of the envisaged State Corporations
Model that is fundamentally different from the past experience of inefficient and politically
controlled public enterprises. In pursuing the establishment of the SCM, we need a well-
defined program that identifies the required industries and sets of functionally and timely
integrated projects. The task could be performed by an independent public entity; i.e. the
“Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC). At this stage of globalization, the
SCM is extremely important for implementing effective economic diversification strategy.
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In addition to the public investment in non-oil industries, the IRDC should also prepare a
program consist of synchronized physical, social, and environmental infrastructure
projects to be allocated for all Governorates that have to be selected on the basis of
overall economic and social criteria; e.g. roads, electricity, water dams, irrigation
schemes, clean water, sewage systems, town planning, economic free zones, industrial
parks, schools, hospitals, and public utilities.[59] The two programs should be financed
by at least 60% of oil revenues during the years 2013-2015 and 80% in 2016 and
onwards.[60] 
2. Modernizing the financial services sector; especially banks, the stock market, and
insurance companies. This sector is the vehicle of investment operations and should be
regulated in accordance with the main objectives of the country's economic strategy. The
CBI should, therefore, take the necessary measures and provide incentives to develop
the banking system and associates institutions and increase the credit facilities, as well
as activate the influence of the interest rates by increasing public awareness of saving
and investment necessities and benefits. 
3. A flexible foreign exchange regime must be established by taking gradual liberalization
steps and share part of the responsibility for improving productivity and sustaining
economic growth and stability as part of the economic diversification strategy but not only
for controlling inflation. Even the CBI practice where the foreign exchange regime used
mainly as an instrument for controlling inflation, it is not quite effective because of the
fiscal policy dominance.[61] Practically, at present, the current foreign exchange regime
is US$ peg regime. The exchange rates of ID must reflect Iraq’s economic reality and
serve the main objectives of the economic diversification strategy. However, the current
practice that reduce imports cost through overvalue of the ID vis-à-vis $US, led to
increase in private consumption only. The latter can not be productive and sustain
economic growth unless it is generated from non-oil industrial and economic
activities.[62] And since there are no idle production capacities, such a situation would
result in increasing the pressure on government spending. 
4. Alleviating poverty by generating income sources for the poor people in addition to the
provision of public services and basic needs. Poverty alleviation can be achieved by
improving labor skill through rehabilitation and vocational training, reforming primary
education, and the promotion of income generated from small projects, as well as by the
implementation of a thoughtful regulated social security benefits system. 
5. Redistribution of income and wealth: In Iraq, a "just" distribution of income is not only
an ethical or social issue, or an issue related to the lack of market mechanism in dealing
with the unfair pattern of income distribution, or it is an issue stemming from the
inefficiency of government fiscal policies in tackling the unsuitable wealth distribution. In
addition and most importantly, it is the public ownership of oil wealth that justifies the
State intervention in putting the income distribution process into a more socially and
economically appropriate priority and path. Oil wealth is the major source of government
expenditures; for investment and consumption, as well as for financing the required
increasing imports which constitute directly and indirectly the major share of the effective
aggregate demand that generate economic growth: i.e. oil  revenues are the engine that
lead to increase profits for the entrepreneurs, rent for the use of the land and assets,
interest rates for utilizing the capital, and wages for hiring labor force. But oil wealth is
owned by all Iraqis and thus it should not be used in activities that increase the
disparities in individual income and wealth. Therefore, the government is obliged to
undertake effective policies and measures to reduce the existing wide gaps in income
and wealth among the citizens.
In practice, the success macroeconomic criteria of the diversification strategy can be summarized by the
following: the contribution of the value added of non-oil activities to GDP should be increased to at least
80%, non-oil revenues should contribute at least 50% to the State’s annual budget,[63] non- oil exports
should increase to at least 70% to total exports, the value added generated by the private sector to GDP
should increase to 70%.[64] In this respect, though the required macroeconomic policies have to be
implemented in view of the suggested economic strategy objectives, they should be flexible for change
to cope with any unexpected macroeconomic events.[65]
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Privatization, FDI, and State Corporations
The recent global financial and Euro zone crises and the resulting slow growth of the world economy
(2008-2009, 2011- to date) has revealed the catastrophic impact of widening gap between the rapid
increase of money and credits on one side and the relative slow pace of increasing production on the
other in the major industrial economies. The divergence between the fast expansion of financial flows
and the limited economic growth is similar to the case of the oil-rentier economies where the
government exorbitant expenditures financed by excessive oil revenues through its macroeconomic
fiscal policy while the expansion of the real economy is limited and fails to match with the successive
financial flows. Hence careful attention should be given to balance the allocation of oil revenues
between government current expenditures and public investment on one side, and manipulate the
macroeconomic policies so as to mobilize the nation's resources for increasing economic growth on the
other. But economic growth should be sustained and, therefore, must be put on the path of the
diversification strategy in which the private sector should play an important role in terms of its value
added ratio to GDP, exports, and public finance. This also necessitates the need for FDI. The promotion
of indigenous and FDI is an essential part of the liberalization reform that would constitute an important
element in increasing the economy competitiveness.
The crucial factor in implementing the economic diversification strategy that is guided by the State’s
future vision is to increase investment in expanding the industrial capacities, especial of high-
technology, as well as in building the physical infrastructure, science and technology promotion projects.
At this stage, the State can provide the financial requirements for building those projects. However, the
operational management of the assumed new industries should be independent and designed as
business-oriented corporations that fit the market competitiveness’ conditions; i.e. corporations have to
be characterized by initiatives, innovations, creativity, and entrepreneurship. Such State Corporations
Model should not be considered as similar to the public sector enterprises model of the period (1964 – to
date). Although the two models are similar as both owned by the State, they have two main significant
differences;
1. The socio-economic objectives of the old public sector enterprises are different from
the objectives of the new State corporations that have to be operated similar to the
private corporation in the free market. 
2. The management of the State corporations are free from government political
intervention and support but only guided by the market conditions.
In 1953, the public sector contributed only 11.8% to GDP, but by 1979, its contribution increased to
80.9%. In 1979, the public sector owned 100% of the oil, electricity, and clean water industries. Also, it
contributed 53% to the total value added of the manufacturing industries, 34.4% of the agriculture, and
23.9% of the construction sector.[66] However, since the nationalization of the major industries and
banks of the private sector in 1964, it was realized that the “socialist and comprehensive planning”
policies have restricted the activities of private sector and fostered the inefficiency of the public
enterprises, especially in the manufacturing industries, banking, and trade, and thus contributed to the
then economic problems. The expansion of public sector which was promoted by the availability of oil
revenues has arrested the development of efficient private sector. Under the pressure of the fall of oil
revenues and the costly war with Iran, the former regime has undertaken a partial, tailor-made, and self-
interest program for the privatization of certain public enterprises during the 1980s. But those measures
have also failed not only to establish the conditions for free market, but also they were unsuccessful to
limit the increasing financial burden of the public enterprises. During the period (1990- 2003), Iraq has
experienced extraordinary difficult circumstances in which the then policies cannot be considered for fair
assessment of the role of the indigenous private sector vis-à-vis the public enterprises.[67]
After April  2003, it was assumed that the ultimate aim of the new economic strategy and policies or as it
was called the “economic shock thereby” is to liberalize the economy from government intervention and
to establish the conditions for free market and private sector activities that would increase investment
and growth, as well as promote competition and in turn improve the economy efficiency. The policies,
including the intended privatization program, have quickly failed.[68] However, the failure cannot change
the fact that the economy is still in dire need for radical structural and intuitional reforms that promote
the role of the indigenous private sector as well as FDI. Therefore, the targeted market reform endeavor
should be carefully designed and implemented by a strong government to fit the allocation of oil
revenues for achieving the goals of diversification strategy.[69] Part of this strategy is to urgently
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privatize the public sector enterprises that cannot be developed into market-oriented large industrial
corporations.
In addition to the targeted improvement of the investment climate by erecting the physical and
institutional infrastructure, privatization of certain public enterprises is also an essential measure. The
program should aim not only to ease the financial burden of the inefficient public enterprises, but more
crucial is to increase the economic competitiveness by liberalizing the economy from government
monopolies and reduce the taxes on income and business profit. However, in Iraq, public ownership of
certain strategic enterprises are still essential for maintaining the State’s security and public interests as
well as for major industrial projects that have comparative advantages by utilizing the public natural
resources; i.e. water, oil, land, and space, such as the petrochemicals and oil refining industries,
communication and IT infrastructure, roads, and water dams. Also, when the private sector is not ready
to invest in the very costly projects that are essential for the economy and the society, such as
production of electricity, the public ownership of those projects is a must. However, Iraq needs to
privatize public enterprises that can be owned by the private sector. If successfully prepared and
implemented, the privatization program would help to increase investment and improve economic
efficiency, as well as mobilize resources for public finance.[70]
To avoid the corruption disease likely associated with the implementation of the program, careful
preparation for identifying candidate enterprises for sale to the private sector, its re-evaluation and
rehabilitation, and setting the rules and the implementation process must be made under the supervision
of the highest executive official authorities.
While incentives should be given to the indigenous private sector to promote investment in all activities,
especially in medium and small industries and export-oriented enterprises, particular incentives should
be given to FDI for indigenizing high-technology industries. Also, regulations for conditional and
temporary protection measures to the infant industries and certain agriculture products must also be
applied in a balanced way. In this regard, it is essential that economic policy should reconcile, in a
practical manner, the need for high-technology industries and the provision of employment opportunities
by expanding production capacities using labor-intensive technology.
For the FDI, the following policy’s guidance and incentives must be observed:
1. For the high-technology industries, corporate tax exemption should be guaranteed and
might extend to more than 10 years, as well as full and partial custom duties allowances
on imported machines and equipments and raw material, except for similar locally
produced. Also, free transfer of profit, wages, and equity returns must be guaranteed.
The required physical infrastructure and basic needs of electricity and water, as well as
credit facilities must be also provided. 
2. Export-oriented industries must also have similar incentives as those for high-
technology projects. 
3. Establishing free economic and industrial zones and innovation parks. 
4. Encouraging R&D projects by providing grants to qualified private enterprises. 
5. Set-up preferable incentives for encouraging FDI in the less developed regions. 
6. Excluding the FDI from investment in the nation's strategic infrastructure and
enterprises; in land, sea, and space. 
7. Ensuring equal treatment with the Iraqi private sector.
These suggestions, with the earlier proposed economic priorities, constitute the basic elements that are
imperative for increasing the competitiveness of the economy.
In practice, the exact identification of the required measures and incentives could be prepared on the
basis of detailed field study that aim to assess the economic environment components; the law and
legal regulations, the conditions of the existing infrastructure, education and training facilities, the extent
and attitude to transparency and corruption, the state of technology, and R&D facilities.
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Conclusions
Iraq, like many oil-rentier countries, is facing serious challenges emanated from the economy’s high
dependence on oil exports for a long-time. By broaden its economic base into diverse range of
competitive production activities, Iraq would be in a better position not only for achieving sustainable
economic growth, accelerating social development, and improving the living standards, but also for
developing a dynamic political system with wide democratic practices.
The assessment of past experience and based on our understanding of why and how the
macroeconomic variables, including oil exports, and the political actors behave under the current and
envisaged circumstances, would lead to the suggestion that until  the economy escapes the "oil-hostage
trap" and the government respects the tax-payer voters: then the public ownership of oil wealth; the
need for democracy; the required competitive economy that is able to integrate into the world economy;
the improvement of the living standards; and the demand for social equality; are all necessitate for
radical change of the current economic and political conditions. The proposed policies are in line with
the lessons derived from the global financial crises and the world economic slowdown (2007-2009 &
2011- to date) which clearly revealed the huge damage caused by the implemented unlimited
international and national financial deregulation policies that have resulted in the adaptation of more
cautious attitude to the role of national and international macroeconomic policies.
Over the last nine years, nothing radical has changed in Iraq; neither the inefficient macroeconomic
policies, nor the political passiveness to economic reforms, or the misuse of money and time consuming
efforts in the rebuilding of the country's infrastructure. Since the prevailing political parties lack the
vision, the will, and the interest in pursuing the required fundamental change, the governments have
relied heavily on spending public oil revenues for performing the state’s normal functions, satisfying the
daily financial and socio-political demand of citizens and social groups, as well as for serving their
political interests. The government's expenditures, which constitute the major share of the aggregate
demand, have not only drained the precious non-renewable energy resource and finally failed to create
wealth and restrain the deterioration of the living standards, but also it deepened the chronic structural
economic problem and substantially increased corruption. Nevertheless, Iraq has ample opportunity in
dealing effectively with the prevailing serious problems, i.e. sluggish production of non-oil sectors, low
productivity, high unemployment, widespread poverty, poor public education and health services, lack of
public utilities and basic needs and the insufficient physical and institutional infrastructure. Guided by
inspiring future national vision and applying effective economic diversification strategy with clear
economic policy priorities, but certainly without the reliance only on “illusion magic” of non-regulated
market mechanism and the independent monetary policy, Iraq must embark on a radical tailor-made
economic and institutional reforms program for increasing indigenous private investment and FDI, as
well as public investment by allocating most of the oil revenues to finance the physical, social; especially
education, and environmental infrastructure projects that have to be managed by an independent public
entity.
At this stage, vigorous state’s owned corporations of high-technology industries must be built and
managed, as private corporations, by independent qualified directors that have the required initiatives,
innovative technology, entrepreneurial, and marketing capacities which qualify them to be competitive in
the markets. The market-oriented SCM would contribute, together with the promotion of medium and
small private enterprises, to the economic growth and diversification. Also necessary, public investment
for improving primary education and extensive training programs for manpower, promoting R&D and
innovation, and supporting creative entrepreneurial initiatives management skill in all sectors.
However, the application of the model should not undermine the urgent implementation of the targeted
privatization programme of the public sector enterprises that cannot be developed into the form of state
corporations.
Socially, the government policies must reduce the existing wide disparity gaps in income and wealth
among individuals and regions by careful allocations of oil revenues for public projects, as well as
through the fiscal policy.
The application of the suggested new economic model needs democratic environment, strong political
will, and liberal forward-thinking by the policy- makers, as well as competent public institutions and
effective non-government organizations and civil societies that are able to invoke the nation’s spirit for
building a strong and stable economy, maintaining political stability, and social progress.
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Annex: The Dynamics of Iraq’s Macroeconomic Analytical Model
Triggered by the recent financial global and Eurozone crises and the resulted slowdown of the world
economy associated with increasing de-globalization measures, the policy-makers and academic debate
on the effectiveness of the national and international macroeconomic policies as originally based on the
neo-classical Keynesian economics; the macroeconomic policy that justify a role of the state for
increasing demand for promoting growth, vis-à-vis the viability of classic economics of capitalism; Adam
Smith’s free market and profit maximization of corporations that stimulate growth without intervention of
the macro fiscal policy and putting more emphasis on the role of independent monetary policy, have
relevance to the problems facing the developed capitalist economies. However, such debate has no
practical value in dealing with the structural problems of the oil-rentier economies like the case of Iraq.
Although there are significant similarities between the causes and symptoms of the global financial
challenges that are facing the developed countries and the problems of the oil-rentier economies: the
exorbitant of credits in the global financial markets and disproportionate spending of the excessive oil
revenues; investment in opaque financial products in the global markets and investment in non-
productive white-elephant projects in the oil -rentier economies; and the widening disparity in wealth and
income at the national levels;[71] these challenges and problems need different remedies. Thus, the
given policy propositions and analysis for Iraq that are based primarily on its experience cannot be
considered in line with the discussion on the effectiveness of classic vis-à-vis neoclassic
macroeconomic policies.
As stated in the “Special Theory of Economic-Rent and Free Market Efficiency (STER),”[72] Iraq’s
actual economic experience, especially during 1970s,[73] provided enough quantitative and qualitative
evidence that allows to put it in a formal dynamic economic model for predicting the behavior of the
macroeconomic variables under different assumptions that are adequately define the initial conditions
and illustrate how the whole economic system evolve over time; i.e. describes the connections of
causes and effects as a result of increasing the government spending that is financed by oil-rent
generated beyond the economic surplus generated from normal production activities. In other words, the
finance for investment is exogenously available. STER is a predictable economic analytical model which
is useful to illustrate the most likely economic development path as assumed in this paper.
It was also stated that the main conditions for increasing economic growth and employment in Iraq can
be summarized as follows: raising domestic private saving for increasing investment, in addition to
increasing public investment, especially in non-oil industries, and increasing non-oil exports.[74] Also,
success criteria have been suggested to assess quantitatively the advance in satisfying theses
necessary conditions.[75] At present, and like the situation during (1974-1980), there are no financial
and foreign currency constraints that constitute binding restrictions on economic growth and the
investment for the reconstruction of the public economic (physical) infrastructure.
Given these growth and development conditions, there are at least three main practical reasons that
necessitate the application of a simple formal macroeconomic model for Iraq:
1. To identify and trace the behavior of the main economic variables through time. 
2. To highlight the first causes of the economic dynamics under current circumstances
and in perspective conditions. 
3. To identify the role of the economic agents; i.e. the state, the private sector, and the
consumers in the economic growth process.
Also, as stated earlier, the proposed macroeconomic model consists of the following main
components:[76]
• The endogenous variables; i.e. GDP, wages, profit, consumption, and imports. 
• The exogenous variables; i.e. oil  exports, non-oil exports, and investment.[77] 
• The parameters; income distribution pattern, the propensity to save in public and in private sector, oil
revenues ratios for government current expenditures and for public investment, the technology
coefficient as reflected by the capital-output ratio, the ratios of investment, intermediate, and consumer
goods and commodities to GDP.[78]
In testing the model’s behavior, the values of the exogenous variables and the parameters are to be
determined by the actual macroeconomic policies of the government (as reflected in the annual budget’s
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revenues and expenditures, total investment, and exports) which are described qualitatively in this
paper.
Since the government control most of the macroeconomic variables, it provides the external costs and
benefits to all economic activities that are not reflected in prices and ignored by the market economy;
i.e. the externalities, as well as maintains the instrument to determine the criterion for influencing the
distribution pattern of income and wealth. Hence, given the described prevailing economic and political
conditions, the first cause that initiates the dynamics of growth and distribution process, is the exorbitant
government spending of the available excessive oil revenues, not the tax payers contribution or the
private savings. Once the effects of government spending starts, the resulting “snow ball” of
expenditures keep rolling and grows due to the increasing demand of the people for better public
services and maintaining low prices of their basic needs and essential imported products. As the ruling
authority struggle to maintain its political power, the size of the rolling “snow ball” continues to be bigger
and bigger with the successive increase of oil revenues which lead to: the improvement of the living
standard in terms of cheap public services; increasing income and consumption but without matching the
required increase in domestic production; increasing productivity; and increasing investment in non-oil
industries. Therefore, unless the government controls the expected change of the macroeconomic
variables behavior in a systematic way, this situation pushes the government further to allocate more
investment for increasing oil exports (revenues) in disregard to the depletion of this valuable public
natural resource and consequently increase the economy’s dependence on it. It is the successive
increase of oil revenues that lead to the increase of non-productive expenditures which comes first in
the dynamics process of the macroeconomic activities which eventually deepening the economic
structural problems.
Since the government ability to manipulate the macroeconomics events over the functioning of the
individual economic activities will be increased by the growing power of oil revenues, then the role of
producers (investors), the consumers, and the workers, who make their decisions on the basis of prices
and wages, cost, and profit, become less effective.
Excessive spending of oil revenues in less productive economic activities acts against the targets of
achieving sustainable economic growth and efficient use of the oil wealth. It is interesting to compare
this actual negative dynamics process of the relationship between oil revenues and economic
development with the dynamics role of the new technology in advancing science that is in turn improving
the technology which opens more doors to scientific achievement.[79] Nevertheless, if oil  revenues
utilized efficiently under the described reforms, it would increase economic growth and maximize
employment of resources which create the wealth for the nation.
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